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Abstract Randomisation and time-sharing are some of the oldest methods to achieve
fairness. I make a case that applying these approaches to social choice settings con-
stitutes a powerful paradigm that deserves an extensive and thorough examination. I
discuss challenges and opportunities in applying these approaches to settings includ-
ing voting, allocation, matching, and coalition formation.
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1 Introduction
Suppose two agents have opposite preferences over the two possible social outcomes.
What should be a fair resolution for this problem?
If the outcome is required to be deterministic, then it is patently unfair to one of
the agents. However, one can regain fairness by at least three different approaches: (1)
resort to randomisation so that each of the social outcomes has equal probability, (2)
treat the outcomes as divisible and resort to time sharing where each social outcome
has half of the time share or, (3) use a uniform frequency distribution if there will be
multiple occurrences of the discrete outcomes. Mathematically, all three resolutions
towards fairness are equivalent because the outcomes have equal probability, time-
share, or frequency. In the rest of the article, when I will describe a probabilistic
approach to social choice, I will use it abstractly so as to model approaches (1), (2),
and (3).
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I argue that although a probabilistic approach has been applied in several social
choice settings in both theory and practice (see e.g., Stone, 2011), there is potential
to revisit fundamental social choice settings such as voting, allocation, matching, and
coalition formation with this powerful paradigm. Considering the natural aversion
of many people to important decisions being based on the toss of the coin, such an
approach may be especially useful for time and budget sharing scenarios. A related
chapter in this book is by Brandt (2018).
2 A case for probabilistic social choice
I first list some of the compelling reasonswhy probabilistic social choice is a powerful
and useful approach.
(i) Modeling time-sharing Some of the settings and their corresponding results
in the literature ignore the possibility of time-sharing. For example, several
results in voting suppose that only one alternative is selected. However, the
voting could be about deciding the fraction of time different genres of music
are played on radio. Similarly most of the results in matching and coalition
formation suppose that agents form exclusively one coalition or set of partner-
ships (Manlove, 2013). Many of these results need to be re-examined when we
allow the flexibility of time-sharing.
(ii) Participatory Budgeting Voting can also be used to decide on which projects
get how much budget (see e.g., (Fain et al., 2016; Aziz et al., 2017)). The ap-
proach is getting traction as grassroots participatory budgeting movements
grow in stature (Cabannes, 2004). In this context, a probabilistic social choice
view is useful because the probability of an alternative can represent the frac-
tion of the budget allocated to it.
(iii) Achieving fairnessAs explained in the example above, a probabilistic or time-
sharing approach to social choice is geared towards achieving fairness. In the
example above, no deterministic mechanism can simultaneously be anonymous
(treat agents symmetrically) and neutral (treat social outcomes symmetrically).
On the other hand, a probabilistic approach easily overcomes this impossibility.
Suppose that in the example, the two social outcomes are allocating one item
each to the agents where one item is valuable to both and the second item
is useless to both. Then the only way to avoid envy is to use a probabilistic
approach in a broad sense.
(iv) Incentivizing participationAnother reason to take a probabilistic approach is
to provide participation incentives (Brandl et al., 2015; Aziz et al., 2017, 2018).
For the example described above, at least one of the agents appears to have no
strict incentive to participate if the decision is made deterministically. On the
other hand, probabilistic rules can be designed that give each voter the ability
to at least make an epsilon difference (in expectation) to the outcome.
(v) Achieving strategyproofness without resorting to dictatorship Some of
the most striking results in social choice give the message that if one wants
agents to have incentives to report truthfully, then one has to resort to dicta-
torship. In our running example it would mean selecting the preferred social
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outcome of one pre-specified agent. However, with a probabilistic or time-
sharing approach, one can still achieve strategyproofness and also circum-
vent the prospect of a single agent with over-riding power (Aziz et al., 2014;
Chen et al., 2013; Procaccia, 2010; Procaccia and Tennenholtz, 2013).
(vi) Achieving stability In much of the social choice and cooperative game the-
ory literature, a theme of results involves the lack of outcome which satis-
fies an appropriate notion of stability. In voting, the most prominent result
within this theme is Condorcet’s theorem says that it can be possible that for
any given social outcome, a majority of people prefer another outcome. How-
ever, Condorcet’s cycles vanish when the probabilistic ‘maximal lottery’ rule
is used (Aziz et al., 2013; Brandl et al., 2016).1 Similarly, core stable outcomes
may not exist for general settings such as hedonic coalition formation in which
agents have preferences over coalitions they are members of. However, if we
allow for probabilistic outcomes or for time-sharing arrangements, there exist
stable outcomes (Aharoni and Fleiner, 2003).
(vii) Circumventing impossibility results Social choice is at times notorious for
some of the bleak impossibility results in its literature. Several results showing
that no apportionment method simultaneously satisfies basic monotonicity ax-
ioms (Young, 1994). However, these problems disappear if a bit of randomisa-
tion is used. Similarly, there are results pointing out that no deterministic voting
rule satisfies some basic consistency properties. However, this is not anymore
the case if one uses the maximal lotteries randomised voting rule (Brandl et al.,
2016).2
(viii) Better welfare guarantees When considering cardinal preferences over out-
comes, a probabilistic approach may achieve better approximation wel-
fare guarantees while simultaneously achieving other axiomatic proper-
ties (Anshelevich et al., 2015; Anshelevich and Postl, 2016; Procaccia, 2010).
In some cases, randomization may allow for better welfare or ex ante Pareto
improvement while satisfying stability constraints (Manjunath, 2016).
3 Research challenges and opportunities
I outlined several advantages of considering a probabilistic approach. At an abstract
level, resorting to randomisation means that one can consider the full continuous
space of outcomes. This can both be a challenge as well as an opportunity for new
and exciting research.
(i) Formalizing and exploring a range of solution concepts and axiomsWhen
considering probabilistic or time sharing approches, there are several ways in
which a solution concept for deterministic settings can be extended to proba-
bilistic settings. Take for example pairwise stability for the classic stable match-
ing problem in which we want to pair men and women in a way so that no man
1 The argument for the existence of such a lottery invokes von Neumann’s minimax theorem.
2 For further discussion on probabilistic approaches to circumvent impossibility results in voting, we
refer to the survey by Brandt (2017).
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and woman not paired with each other want to elope. When considering prob-
abilistic outcomes, there is a hierarchy of stability concepts that are all gener-
alisations of deterministic stability (Aziz and Klaus, 2017; Dogan and Yildiz,
2016; Kesten and Unver, 2015; Manjunath, 2016). Understanding the nature
and structure of these properties is already a significant research direction.
More importantly, the potential to generalize important axioms based on stabil-
ity, Pareto optimality, and fairness in several different ways gives useful creative
leeway for institution designers for exploring the tradeoffs and compatibility
between different levels of properties.
Similar to the potential of defining a several levels of axiomatic properties, one
can explore different levels of properties of mechanisms. A case in point is
strategyproofness and participation incentives.
(ii) Eliciting, representing, and reasoning about preferences In most voting
or matching settings, agents express preferences over deterministic outcomes.
As we move from deterministic to probabilistic settings, there is an interest-
ing challenge to elicit and represent agents’ risk attitudes towards different
lotteries. One possible approach that involves compact preferences is to ex-
tend the agents’ preferences over discrete outcomes to preferences over prob-
abilistic outcomes by lottery extension methods such as first order stochas-
tic dominance (Brandl, 2013; Brandt, 2017; Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001;
Aziz et al., 2013; Cho, 2016).
(iii) Designing time-sharing mechanisms Since modeling time-sharing is one of
the most important motivations of probabilistic social choice, it is impor-
tant to come up with compelling time-sharing mechanisms. Although voting
has been studied for decades, a probabilistic perspective leads to interesting
and meaningful new voting rules (see e.g., Aziz and Stursberg, 2014). When
allowing for fractional outcomes, several well-known mechanisms such as
Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance or Gale’s Top Trading Cycles need to be
generalized (Kesten and Unver, 2015; Athanassoglou and Sethuraman, 2011;
Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2004).
(iv) Efficiency issuesWhen trying to achieve fairness via randomization, a straight-
forward approach is to uniformly randomize over reasonable deterministic
outcomes or reasonable deterministic mechanisms. However, such a naive
approach such as randomizing over Pareto optimal alternatives can lead
to loss of ex ante efficiency. This phenomenon is starkly highlighted by
the fact that random serial dictatorship that involves uniform randomization
over the class of serial dictatorships can lead to unambiguous loss of wel-
fare (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001; Aziz et al., 2013). This issue motivates
the need to design interesting new mechanisms that are not victim to such a
phenomenon.
(v) Computational complexity Generally speaking, optimising in continuous en-
vironments is computationally more tractable than in discrete environments.
However, when considering time-sharing outcomes that are implicitly con-
vex combinations of a potentially exponential number of discrete outcomes,
computing the time shares can be a computationally arduous task (Aziz et al.,
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2014). Therefore, when formulating time-sharing mechanisms for different so-
cial choice settings, computational complexity rears its head as a potential chal-
lenge as well an opportunity for innovative algorithmic research.
(vi) Instantiating a lottery As mentioned earlier, uniformly randomizing over de-
sirable outcomes can result in loss of efficiency or computational intractabil-
ity. Therefore, mechanisms may first use an alternative way to find an ex-
pected ‘fractional’ outcome—say a weighted matching signifying probabil-
ities for partnerships. If approach (1) is being used, then the expected out-
come needs to be instantiated via a concrete lottery. Finding a suitable lot-
tery is trivial in single-winner voting and easy for simple assignment set-
tings3 but can become a challenge for richer settings with more complex con-
straints (Budish et al., 2013). When instantiating a lottery, an interesting chal-
lenge that arises is to instantiate over deterministic outcomes that also sat-
isfy some weaker notions of stability, fairness, or other properties (see e.g.,
(Teo et al., 2001; Akbarpour and Nikzad, 2017)).
To conclude, a probabilistic approach to social choice in particular voting, alloca-
tion, matching, and coalition formation leads to several interesting research questions
and directions.
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